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Defendants close their appeal the same way they opened their defense: "Plaintiffs were 
fraudulently induced into a good deal." Defendants think that if four years of inflation, 
Plaintiffs' improvements to the property, Plaintiffs' management of the property, and Plaintiffs' 
leasing of the property, resulted in a sale by a third party for more than Plaintiffs paid for the 
property, Defendants should be free to keep the $281,000 by which they cheated Plaintiffs. Utah 
law does not support such a conclusion. In fact, Utah law allows for punitive damages against 
those who think that way to deter such dealings. 
Had Plaintiffs not been defrauded the property would no doubt have enjoyed the same 
inflationary increases, but Plaintiffs would have paid $71,000 less for the property and would not 
have incurred the extra $210,000 in costs the jury found Defendants' machinations to have 
caused. Defendants' inability to grasp the seriousness of their wrong is the major factor which 
led the jury to impose the punitive damages it found in this case. The attitudes Defendants 
continue to demonstrate argue for reinstatement of the full jury verdict. 
By the time Plaintiffs learned of Defendants' fraud they had already invested substantial 
additional funds into the property, had already expended substantial effort in modernizing the 
building, and had already launched a successful leasing campaign. At that point Mr. Knapp 
offered to merely pay them what they had paid for the property, without reimbursement for their 
money and time, and without an increase for the fact that the vacant-when-purchased building 
now had tenants. 
Had Plaintiffs been forced to accept that resolution of Mr. Knapp's fraud, Mr. Knapp 
would have benefitted from his fraud. But, under Utah law a tortfeasor is not allowed to benefit 
from his fraud. Nor is he relieved of the consequences of his fraud by favorable market forces. 
1 
Choices do have consequences. Mr. Knapp chose to defraud Plaintiffs.1 As a result of that fraud 
Mr. Knapp was able to put an extra $71,000 in his own pocket and he cost Plaintiffs $210,000 
more in lost opportunities and inflated purchase price. Under Utah law Mr. Knapp is required to 
disgorge his ill-gotten gains and make Plaintiffs whole for the damages his fraud and neglect of 
duty cost. His callousness about his conduct makes him liable for the punitive damages the jury 
imposed. 
L UNDER UTAH LAW, WHEN DEFENDANT APPEALS, THE PLAINTIFF WHO 
ACCEPTED A REMITTITUR CAN CROSS APPEAL ALL ISSUES. 
As pointed out in Plaintiffs' opening brief, more than ample evidence was submitted to 
support the $210,000 in negligence damages the jury found. The difference between the 
purchase price and the price Diversified would have paid for the property had Defendants not 
neglected their fiduciary duty to get their client the very best deal possible, and the interest on 
that money, was more than ample. [TT 53,132-133,137, Ex. 87] When one considers the 
evidence of unearned commission [Ex. 51] and illegal kickbacks [TT 324], the jury could 
actually have gone higher. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot challenge the remitted negligence damages 
because Plaintiffs accepted the remitted judgment and because Defendants challenge only the 
1
 Mr. Knapp continues to deny he did anything wrong. He attempts to shift the blame for 
this episode to Mr. Turner. He continues to refuse to accept that the jury found him guilty of 
fraud, and the evidence of his fraud - not simply ratification of Turner's fraud, but his own 
culpable fraud, was abundant. He and Turner orchestrated the whole sham transaction between 
University Properties, Inc. and First Security Bank. Mr. Knapp never had a bona-fide intent to 
purchase the building ftom First Security Bank. He only intended to tie up the building while his 
accomplice, Turner, turned up a patsy to pay the inflated price these two real estate agents created 
by inserting themselves into the middle of a transaction they had fiduciary duties to stay clear of. 
[TT 350, 393-394, 397] 
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punitive damages award on appeal. Defendants are wrong for two reasons. 
First, the amount of damages the jury awarded as a result of Defendants' neglect of their 
fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs is an integral element in judging whether this jury was carried away 
by passion or prejudice. The jury which found Plaintiffs were injured by $281,000 (nearly one-
third of the purchase price) may have considered the impact of Defendants' actions on the 
Plaintiffs to be greater than did the judge, who remitted this amount. 
Secondly, sound public policy as enunciated by this Court in Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), modified 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980), allows 
Plaintiffs to appeal all issues once they have been forced into an appeal. 
In Terry this Court addressed this issue and determined that once defendant appealed the 
judgment plaintiff was free to attack the remittitur, even though defendant's attack was on failure 
to grant a JNOV and not on the amount of the remittitur. The Court reasoned: 
The objective underlying the recommended procedure for granting an option to 
accept judgment for a reduced amount of damages in lieu of having a new trial, 
where the damages awarded by the jury are determined by the trial court to be 
excessive, is to avoid the delay and expense of an appeal or a new trial. In most 
situations, it is likely that the party will accept judgment for such reduced 
damages rather than undergo the expense, delay, and uncertainty of result of an 
appeal or new trial. Nevertheless, if a party found liable to pay damages appeals 
the judgment resulting from the other party's accepting such reduced damages, 
this objective has been negatived. When plaintiff is forced to undergo an appeal 
by the action of the opposing party, after plaintiff has accepted judgment for such 
reduced damages, it seems unfair to prevent his having a review of the trial court's 
determination leading to the reduction in damages, especially if plaintiff has 
accepted same only to avoid the delay and expense attending an appeal. 
Furthermore, the new rule herein announced may to some extent discourage 
appeals by the party held liable because of the possibility that the party who has 
accepted judgment for the reduced damages may prevail on his motion for review 
and have the jury's verdict reinstated. 
Id. at 326, 327. Thus there are two public policy reasons for allowing Plaintiffs to appeal the 
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remittitur if Defendant appeals: (1) Plaintiffs have been deprived of the peace they bought by 
accepting remittitur; and, (2) Defendants need to be discouraged from lightly pursuing appeals of 
remitted judgments. Both purposes are served by rejecting Defendants' argument in this case. 
Plaintiffs have been denied the peace acceptance of the remittitur should have brought because of 
Defendants' appeal.2 Defendants in this case have obviously not considered seriously the 
consequences of their actions and the added turmoil they cause the Plaintiffs by appeal. They 
need the downside potential of knowing that having appealed it is within the province of the 
Court to reinstate this jury verdict. Since the evidence clearly supports the jury verdict, it should 
be reinstated. 
II. UNDUE EMPHASIS ON THE RATIO OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO 
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES RESULTS IN IMPROPER 
INTERFERENCE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JURY. 
Defendants argue and indeed the trial court seemed persuaded that the ratio of actual to 
punitive damages is more important than the other six factors and of itself may require 
interference with the jury's award. In this regard, the trial court noted "Defendants rely, in total, 
upon the ratio of damages awarded to punitive damages to support their claim that the punitive 
damages are excessive." Memorandum Decision at p. 4. As this court reemphasized in 
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 9815642001 (Utah Oct. 
19, 2001), however, such is not Utah law. In Campbell this Court made it clear that: 
[T]he ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not determinative. It is simply 
one of the factors to be considered, none of which is more important or conclusive 
than another. 
2
 It should be noted that Defendants have not conceded liability for the remitted 
negligence claim nor paid the amount of the remittitur. 
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[I]f the other six factors support a large punitive damages award, a judge should 
not decrease the amount solely because of the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages. 
Id at f 49. 
This jury was presented with compelling evidence that a large punitive damage award is 
necessary in this case to convince Defendants that their conduct is unacceptable, and to send a 
message to an industry that it needs to clean up. Central to those considerations is Defendants' 
callousness toward ethical, fair dealing. 
The Haws Companies defended the case on the argument that what Defendants did 
complied with the standard in the real estate industry. As the trial court expressly held, Mr. 
Knapp: 
Demonstrated an incredibly arrogant and uncaring attitude on the stand when 
asked about the lies and half-truths propounded by Mr. Turner at his behest. In 
spite of his training as a real estate professional, completion of law school, and a 
degree in business administration he appears perfectly willing to place an 
opportunity for personal profit ahead of ethical fair dealing. [R 2082] 
Nor has Mr. Knapp yet gotten the message that in Utah parties are expected to tell the 
truth, and are expected to fulfill their fiduciary duties, and cannot profit from a breach of their 
duty to others. Defendants continue to argue: Plaintiffs were "fraudulently induced into a good 
deal," apparently believing that an agent who gets a really good deal for the person he represents 
is entitled to steal part of the profit. 
Unless this Court reinstates the original jury verdict, Mr. Knapp will do it again.3 
3
 As stated by the trial court: "Unless Mr. Knapp changes his conduct and attitude a very 
real possibility exists that Mr. Knapp will seek to exploit circumstances such as this on a future 
occasion." [R 2082] 
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HI. DEFENDANTS5 FAILURE TO COMPREHEND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR 
OFFENSE PROVIDED A SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE JURY TO IMPOSE 
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES IT IMPOSED. 
While the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages triggers the court's 
scrutiny of a verdict, the court should not feel compelled to reduce the verdict when other factors 
show that the jury acted on legitimate societal concern and not from improper passion or 
prejudice. 
As noted by Judge Taylor, Mr. Knapp's contempt for the legal process and fair and 
equitable dealings was not lost on this jury. Mr. Knapp continues to demonstrate this contempt 
by failing to acknowledge his wrong. 
A. DEFENDANTS AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED THE RIGHT TO RELY ON 
THE MERGER CLAUSE OF THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT. 
Contrary to Defendants' representations, Defendants never challenged the Court's 
instruction that "an integration clause in the contract does not bar recovery for fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation." See Partial Transcript of February 25, 2000 proceedings at 46-48. No 
instruction was proposed by Defendants, and when Plaintiffs proposed the instruction given 
based on the Utah cases, Defendants' counsel replied: "I won't make that argument." IdL Thus 
there was an express waiver of this issue until after the jury had returned its verdict. 
B. DEFENDANTS' CASES DO NOT JUSTIFY THEIR DEEDS. 
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975) cuts against Defendants. In Henderson 
while the plaintiffs did not move for a directed verdict per se Mrs. Henderson requested an 
instruction for a directed verdict in her favor. This, said the Supreme Court, "Sufficiently 
apprised the court of the situation just as much as a motion would have done." Here, not only 
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did Defendants not seek a jury instruction, they expressly approved Plaintiffs' instruction and 
stated they would not argue the position their lawyers now advocate. Similarly LeBaron & 
Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479,487 (Utah App. 1991) destroys 
Defendants' argument that the issue was preserved by being raised in post-trial motions. There 
the Court held: 
Utah courts have stated that reference to an issue in post-trial motions is 
insufficient to raise an issue not previously raised. [Citations omitted.] It would 
make little sense to allow a party to proceed at trial without submitting a legal 
theory to the court, and then allow that party to raise the issue following trial and 
require the court to reopen trial to consider the issue. 
Id at 484. 
The reasoning of the Dupont court does not help Defendants. That case held the issue 
was preserved if the argument had previously been made to the trial court and rejected. Nowhere 
was this argument made before the jury returned its verdict. Indeed, even if it had previously 
been raised, Defendants clearly told the trial court, "I won't make the argument [that a merger 
clause precludes claims for fraud]." [Partial Transcript of February 25, 2000 proceedings at 46-
48.] 
Defendants' reliance on Belgard and Matsonas is misplaced. In each of these criminal 
cases the Supreme Court found that the trial court had implicitly or explicitly waived the rule's 
requirement that such issues be raised before trial. In this case. Judge Taylor expressly found 
that Defendants had failed to properly preserve the merger clause issue and expressly found that 
the instruction he gave was good Utah law. None of the cases cited by Defendants involves the 
situation where a party invites the alleged legal error - not simply through failing to object - but 
by affirmatively acknowledging that the legal theory the court is considering is correct and 
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stating UI won't make that argument." [Id] The cases cited by Defendants and their false factual 
assertions show their claim, that this issue was not expressly waived, to be frivolous. 
C. THE DEFRAUDED PARTY, EVEN IN THE FACE OF A MERGER 
CLAUSE, CAN AFFIRM THE CONTRACT AND SUE FOR DAMAGES. 
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY REVEAL THE 
CALLOUSNESS THAT JUSTIFIED THE JURY VERDICT. 
Defendants try to argue that the law will not allow a tortfeasor to keep his ill-gotten gains 
if the purchaser chooses to rescind, but he gets to profit from his fraud if Plaintiffs do not 
discover his machinations until it is too late to rescind. Defendants are wrong. 
It is not Plaintiffs' choice to rescind or not rescind that determines the effect of a merger 
clause. Rather, whether a merger clause prevents a plaintiff from pursuing fraud remedies turns 
not on a plaintiffs decision to rescind or affirm, but on the nature of a defendant's 
misrepresentation. If defendant's misrepresentations are intentional, public policy will not allow 
him to keep his ill-gotten gains, no matter what he has induced the plaintiff to sign. On the other 
hand, if his statements were honest mistake, a merger clause prevents him having to answer to 
the plaintiff. Wilkinson v. Carpenter, 276 Ore. 311, 554 P.2d 512 (1976), cited by Defendants, 
actually follows this reasoning. There the court, quoting 12 Williston on Contracts 467, § 1511 
(3rd Ed. 1970), said: 
Liability for innocent misrepresentation may be excluded by the express terms of 
the contract; but if the contract attempts to provide against liability for 
misrepresentation of any kind, it will be restricted, on grounds of public policy, to 
honest misrepresentation. 
In short, the weight of authority recognizes no distinction between actions for 
damages and suits for rescission based upon innocent misrepresentations which 
have been specifically disclaimed in the contract of sale. Nor have we been able 
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to discern any persuasive reason why such a distinction should be made. Both 
causes should be precluded by such a disclaimer unless actual fraud can be 
established. If actual fraud can be established, neither remedy should be 
precluded. (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Knapp's misrepresentations were not "honest misrepresentation/' The fraudulent 
scheme of Messrs. Turner and Knapp to insert themselves into the deal and reap $70,000 in ill-
gotten gains was premeditated, intentional, and part of their pattern of operation. Moreover, the 
specific misrepresentation that inflated the purchase price by $85,000 was intentional. The 
evidence showed that Plaintiffs specifically asked the purchase price. Mr. Turner called Mr. 
Knapp in Florida and asked the purchase price, and then responded with the false statement. 
[TT 731-32] No "honest misrepresentation" which public policy would permit to be waived.4 
It is true that a plaintiff has an election of remedy when he has been defrauded. He can 
choose to rescind and be put back in the position he was in before the fraud. Or, if he has 
invested time, money or effort before being apprised of the fraud, he can affirm the contract and 
sue for damages to put him in the position, he would have been in had the fraud not occurred. 
Defendants have failed to articulate any public policy purpose that would be served by allowing 
the tortfeasor to keep money obtained by fraud simply because he successfully covered his tracks 
until the purchaser was in too deep to get out. 
To reject Defendants' argument that the merger clause in this case somehow permits them 
to keep the $281,336 that the jury found they had purloined from Plaintiffs, one need only 
examine what Defendants are saying. 
Defendants were real estate agents. One of them, Mr. Turner, was expressly Plaintiffs' 
4
 Nor did they care that their scheme cost Plaintiffs another $210,000. 
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agent whose duty it was to get Plaintiffs the very best deal he could get on Plaintiffs' purchase of 
this building. The other, Mr. Knapp, lied about being an agent [TT 56], but because he was, and 
was in the same firm with Turner [IdJ, had the same fiduciary duties as Plaintiffs. Instead of 
fulfilling their fiduciary duties, these men cooked up a scheme whereby they purchased the 
building themselves in order to resell it to their client. [TT 303, 350, 393-394; 397] This scheme 
itself was fraudulent, and by the jury's calculation cost Plaintiffs $210,000 in profits they 
otherwise would have made on the purchase. 
To add insult to injury, when Defendants were asked point blank how much they paid 
First Security Bank for the building they lied. [TT 62,166-167] They said they bought it for 
$70,000 more than they actually paid. 
Now Defendants argue that they should keep the $70,000 they lied to obtain, and should 
not pay the Plaintiffs the $210,000 their fraudulent scheme cost Plaintiffs because even with 
these profits skimmed off through fraud the deal was still a good deal! Defendants appear to be 
arguing that when a real estate agent finds a very good deal he is entitled by law to steal a portion 
of the profit so long as he does not steal it all! 
Defendants have a very jaundiced view of Utah law. It was this callous disregard of the 
law and of the rights of people who deal with real estate professionals and these Defendants that 
led the jury to the amount of punitive damages they awarded in this case. This same callous 
disregard for the importance of truth in dealings and fidelity to fiduciary duties should persuade 
this Court that the jury was correct and the full jury verdict should be reinstated. 
Much of the case law relied upon by Defendants is contrary to their position. In Lamb v. 
Bangait 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) defendants were charged with having represented that a bull 
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was a breeder and having omitted material facts about his health. The parties had made provision 
in the contract for the contingency if the bull died after the sale but before 1500 ampules of 
semen had been collected. The sale was made and the bull died. Plaintiffs sued under the 
contract for breach of warranty and sued in tort for fraud. 
Defendants argued that the contract provision allocating the risk upon death of the bull 
was plaintiffs sole remedy. The court disagreed, holding: 
[A] contract clause limiting liability will not be applied in a fraud action. The law 
does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect a person against his 
own fraud on the ground of public policy. A contract limitation on damages or 
remedies is valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud. 
Id at 608. 
Defendants argue in footnote 6 that this case is somehow akin to Pace v. Parrish, 122 Ut. 
141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), in which the court found that plaintiffs did not use reasonable care to 
examine the condition of the property they were buying in order to discover obvious defects. 
This argument is an outgrowth of Defendants' failure to come to grips with the magnitude of 
their bad deeds. It was wrong for Defendants to lie about what they were paying First Security 
Bank. As wrong as that was, however, it was only the icing on the cake. The real fraud was the 
scheme whereby two real estate agents who should have been plying their best efforts to get 
Plaintiffs the best deal they could from First Security Bank instead pretended one of them was 
not a real estate agent but a bona fide third party who had purchased the property. [TT 57-58, 62, 
166-167] That fraudulent scheme did not appear until years after the fraud when in deposition 
Mr. Knapp outlined the scheme and admitted it was something he and Mr. Turner had done 
before. 
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Moreover, Defendants' argument ignores the facts presented to the jury. Mr. Parrish did, 
in fact, ask what price was paid to First Security Bank and was told a lie by Mr. Turner and Mr. 
Knapp. [TT 62, 71, 166-167] Mr. Knapp instructed the people at the closing not to disclose to 
Plaintiffs the details of the First Security Bank transaction when they were asked [TT 365]. 
Further, when Plaintiffs asked after the sale about the First Security Bank transaction the Haws 
Defendant's response was, "Oh, did that deal close, where is our commission"! [TT 85] 
It is obvious that Plaintiffs were sufficiently diligent to prevent calloused and practiced 
con men from being able to claim caveat emptor.5 For Mr. Knapp to make such an argument 
* Surprisingly, Defendants argue that none of the cases cited by Plaintiffs support the 
argument that fraud can be proven even if a contract with a merger clause is affirmed. 
Apparently Defendants did not take the time to read the cases. Sperau v. Ford Motor Company, 
674 So.2d 24 (Ala. 1995) was not a rescission case. Rather, plaintiffs sued in contract and in 
fraud. There the court held that the existence of merger clauses in the contract did not prevent 
the fraud claims. Id at 35. Similarly, Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 819 P.2d 
69 (Colo. 1991) simply allows the defrauded purchaser to recover negligent misrepresentation 
damages despite a merger clause, making no distinction between rescission or affirmation. The 
Agristor Leasing v. Savior, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1986) case does not deal with rescission. The 
court granted summary judgment against the defendants for remaining payments. However, the 
court allowed the counterclaim against seller for fraud notwithstanding the merger clause. In 
Moffatt Enterprises, Inc. v. Borden. Inc., 807 F.2d 1169 (3rd Cir. 1986) the court held that on 
proof of fraud the plaintiff may avoid the release provision of a contract. IcL It was induced 
through fraudulent misrepresentation. The court recognized that in Pennsylvania, as in Utah, a 
defrauded plaintiff has three choices: (1) sue for damages for deceit; (2) rescind and seek 
restitution; and, (3) seek reformation of the contract. Salkeld v. U.R. Business Brokers, 549 
N.E.2d 1151 (111. App. 1989). In Chase v. Columbia National Corp., 832 F. Supp. 654 (S.D.N.Y 
1993) the court held that an action for fraud in the inducement of a contract is separate from an 
action for breach of contract and is not barred by a merger clause. In Lance v. Bowe, 648 N.E.2d 
60 (Ohio App. 1994) the court, in a case where contract was affirmed, holds that a clause in a 
contract limiting liability will not preclude liability for a fraudulent misrepresentation. In 
Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 391 S.E.2d 577 (S.C. 1990) the court held that a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in giving information exists when the defendant has a pecuniary interest 
in the transaction and that a merger or integration clause in the contract does not prevent a party 
from proceeding on a misrepresentation claim, whether fraudulent or negligent. In Silva v. 
Stevens, 589 A.2d 852 (Vt. 1991) the court states: "We have emphasized that it is not a defense 
that plaintiff might, but for his own negligence, have discovered the wrong." The court then 
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shows his complete inability to grasp the wrong he has committed. The real estate industry 
would benefit from this Court reinstating the jury verdict in this case. 
DATED th i s j j / day of December, 2001. 
ATKIN & HAWKINS, P.C. 
Counsel for Appellee/Cross Appellant 
ruled that the presence of an "as is" clause in a sales contract does not, as a matter of law, defeat 
a fraud claim, (same principle also applies if the claim is based on negligence or strict liability). 
Similarly, in Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561 (W.Va. 1990) the court concluded that an "as 
is" clause in a contract of sale for real estate will not relieve the vendor of his obligation to 
disclose conditions which substantially affect value of the property. 
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